Babangida, Abacha’s Burden

By IfeanyiChukwu Afuba

This is not a review of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida’s memoir, A Journey In _Service_publicly presented on February 20, 2025. It’s an interrogation of a single item, a claim which though contained in the book, could equally have been made elsewhere, in a different setting.

The basis of this engagement is national history. General Babangida was widely reported to have expressed regret over the fiasco that took over the June 12, 1993 presidential poll. ‘I would later find out that the “forces” led by general Sani Abacha annulled the election’ Babangida wrote in an excerpt from the book.

The general is entitled to his views but cannot privatise a national discouse such as the controversial assertion that the annulment of the election was forced on him, Babangida, by then defence chief, general Sani Abacha’s camp.

Despite the claim of ultimate responsibility attached to the revelation, the narrative tends to lend extenuation to Babangida’s culpability. It stirs up a feeling of exceptional circumstances surrounding the annulment, much of it beyond the control of Babangida.

The proposition conjures up image of hawkish officers holding the ruling general hostage to accede to their demand. It speaks of a situation of helplessness on the part of the junta head at the rebellion of his loyalists. The suggestion that flows from this is that of a weak commander in chief, a fronted leader without the real power of office. This is sometimes true of the power game.

Generally, the power circuit is fluid, fluctuating from competitive struggles to shared power and dominance. There comes a time when a ruler concedes some ground to his competitors. This concession, however, is a prioritisation of the stakes relevant to their continued hold on the reins of authority. This was the case in the ousting of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe as Chief of General Staff in October 1986. Babangida sacrificed Ukiwe’s political balancing for Abacha’s military support.

However, in determining to what extent circumstances influences power play, and in this instance, if Babangida was coerced into election annulment, the personality of the power wielder is of utmost importance.

Babangida described himself as a man “trained to dominate my environment.” This is a statement of pride, of self assurance, and approval, volunteered some forty years ago, in review of his military journey. When asked who were his heroes, Babangida mentioned Shaka the Zulu and Hannibal. The answer is one that sets off a beep on the “dominating environment” keyboard. Shaka and Hannibal were historical warriors of great fame.

They were renowned as much for their military strategies as their guts. They were men who dared. After navigating the mine field of coups and counter coups in two decades of military career, Babangida had a fair idea of what to do with power when he grabbed it. On August 27, 1985, while the tanks still rumbled in the streets of Lagos, he made history as the first coup maker to take the civilian title of President.

The political subtlety was lost on many at the time. We will return to this point shortly but let it be said that the paths walked by the armoured corp general do not depict a pliable leader but a character with ambition and resolve. Babangida, a calculative student of power, seemed conscious of the fact that he, a fringe northerner, had deposed and succeeded a core northerner on the throne. If the perception was not strong at the time, it was bound to take hold sooner than later.

To consolidate the junta’s hold on power, Babangida moved to endear his rulership to the Islamic North establishment. Less than six months into the life of the regime, Nigeria secretly became a member of Organisation of Islamic Countries – as it was then called. It was a deliberate, coded message, which explains why the outrage that greeted the news was ignored.

Far from being a docile ruler susceptible to public opinion, let alone intimidation by any quarter, general Ibrahim Babangida proved himself a long distance runner, once he had set his sights on a target. He employed public relations practices to buy time and invest his decisions with veneer of consultation. The touch of engagement that accompanied the junta’s administration was deceptive. It was a populist hoax. The direction to travel on any issue was settled ab initio in the mind of the junta rulership.

Allow a semblance of participation; then the military government makes it’s pronouncement. And when the government speaks, that is final because we’re not a democracy! This gimmickry was at play when the junta asked Nigerians to debate the desirability of taking the IMF loan. It was followed by another futile debate on the country’s political future.

On each occasion, the people’s preferences were rejected after elaborate, time and resource – consuming undertakings. This sedating of the public psyche began with the media expose of the Buhari era detention centres. But it was only a short while before the new regime went on it’s own spree of absolute decrees and arbitrary arrests. In no time, the same detention structures were populated by prisoners of conscience.

Babangida’s relentless pursuit of power does not jell with the tale of someone conscripted into the June 12 conspiracy. As military head of state, his power was elastic. And he had his way on a wide range of contentious matters. The expression “game of musical chairs” gained currency in that era. It was used by the media to describe the endless shuffle and reshuffle of appointees in government.

Ministers, governors, members of commissions and parastatals were hired and fired as it suited the calculation of the dictator. The dispensing and withdrawal of these patronages at will, aided the tracks of loyalty and cult following. Not even the highest governing body was free from the machinations. Decree 17 of 1985 empowered the commander in chief to appoint the service chiefs and members of the ruling council.

And on February 6, 1989, Babangida dissolved the Armed Forces Ruling Council without a protest from any of the members. It would be dissolved again in 1992 and renamed National Security and Defence Council on reconstitution. The number and individual membership of these bodies were no longer a function of military position held but simply the commander in chief’s prerogative.

By the time of the 1993 presidential election, Babangida was still the dominant power holder. General Sani Abacha had some clout but he was not a popular officer in the military. Babangida had the dual advantage of being in control of the levers of authority and the resources for getting things done. If Abacha and his “boys” bulldozed the annulment through, it was probably because they saw it in accord with both Babangida’s and their own interests.

A reading of the circumstances points to the angle that the dictator did not wish a successful conclusion of the election. A stalemated or inconclusive poll would be in his favour because he was an unofficial candidate waiting by the wings.

This is where we reconnect with Babangida’s adoption of the civilian designation of President on coup day August 27, 1985. There were separate disclosures by Lt Col Tony Nyiam and Major Debo Basorun that soon after he mounted the saddle, Babangida commissioned a study on Gamel Abdul Nasser’s switch from military to civilian leadership. The Babangida regime’s transition to civil rule programme was flawed.

It’s inconsistency with the tenets of democracy persuaded many that the programme had a hidden agenda. The transition process was elongated, drawn out and staggered in such a way to make participants tired and uncertain.

At some points in the journey, certain categories of politicians were banned, unbanned and rebanned from running for office. On the face of it, the ban looked like an attempt at introducing discipline into the political system. However, the measure had the effect of taking older, experienced and financially strong politicians away from the scene, leaving the coast clear for the so – called newbreed.

In the event, it was the “newbreed”, largely young and coming into government for the first time, that co – travelled with Babangida towards conclusion of the transition.

Moshood Abiola’s victory in the presidential election was a surprise for some, shattering traditional voting patterns. The result was shocking for the conservative political establishment, north and south alike. Although the two party system foisted by the military regime, conditioned Nigerians towards novel, alternate choices, the old guard did not expect a level of disruption that would see the NRC candidate, Bashir Tofa, losing his home state of Kano. The election outcome was also startling for the junta. Perhaps, there were reasonable grounds for a different expectation from the polls. The two government created parties were regarded as being of near equal strength. If there was any consideration of stronger party, it would be Tofa’s NRC which was in control of 16 states to SDP’s 14 states.

Factoring in both regional and personality appeal, not a few analysts were of the view that it would be a close race. An inconclusive exercise would have suited the ‘IBB Should Continue’ campaign led by the Association for Better Nigeria at the time. In the aftermath of the annulment’s back and forth, Babangida addressed the National Assembly on August 17, 1993 on constituting an interim national government. With unspoken words and innuendos, he told the newbreed legislators: I _made it possible for you to be here. Without the ban of the older generation , you won’t be in office today. Help me bury June 12 and together we can march on through the ING ._A day or two later, he told the BBC he was waiting for the National Assembly’s response to his address. A last ditch attempt by the pro Babangida legislators to pass an extension resolution for the dictator on August 25, 1993 was thwarted by House of Representatives Speaker, Agunwa Anaekwe and his allies.

Defending the execution of Mamman Vatsa for coup plotting, Babangida wrote: “I had to choose between saving a friend’s life and the nation’s future.” It was also his contention that the “law and the imperatives of order and national security are overriding.” Curiously, these same ideals were not invoked when it came to the matter of June 12 election. Why were the instigators of annulment not resisted on the overriding grounds of political stability and national interest? Obviously, self interest stood in the way of resisting the annulment.

Abacha may have pushed for the annulment but Babangida tried to take advantage of the situation. In the end, Abacha became the prime beneficiary of the annulment. The burden lies with the duo. Perhaps, Babangida may feel a heavy weight taken off his shoulder after his apologies.